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MEANING AND PROFESSIONALISM IN
AMERICAN LAW*
Paul D. Carrington**
The Emperor Justinian boasted that his Code would never require the attention of lawyers, because his law was written in such
plain language that every literate person would forever comprehend
its mandates. I As of course we know, lawyers and jurists have for
many centuries since argued over the meaning of the good Emperor's Code and of those later codes written to replace his with
language plainer still.
In striving for perfect clarity, Justinian had two great advantages. As Emperor, he was free to utter mandates of his own choosing and to express them precisely in words of his own choosing.
Also, in writing laws chiefly for use in resolving private disputes
rather than to organize or control his own imperial government or
even to regulate a national economy, he had less need for complex
norms. Despite these advantages, the language of his Codes proved
to be highly indeterminate.
Nevertheless, a substantial measure of certainty was afforded
by Justinian's work. Many, many disputes were resolved by reference to his Code and many transactions planned and consummated
in confidence that judicial decisions had been predicted within the
limits of a tolerable margin of error.
It is unlikely that any of these predictions were achieved by
reference to the thoughts of Emperor Justinian himself. It would
have been preposterous for those relying on his Codes to have pursued Justinian's own "original understanding." First, because his
knowledge and understanding of what he decreed was extremely
shallow. And, second, because the inquiry would have defeated the
• This paper was presented to the Association of American Law Schools Workshop
on Constitutional Law, January 6, 1993.
•• Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University.
I. This is inferred from C. 7.45.13, which sets forth the maxim non exemplis sed /egibus
indicandum est, meaning that the cases should be decided according to the statutory text, not
examples, such as earlier decisions of judges, for these might be wrong. See XIV The Civil
Law 188-89 (S.P. Scott, ed., Central Trust Co., 1932).
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Emperor's purpose, which was to proclaim a common understanding shared by all subjects of the imperial crown.
The stability of the Roman law was achieved by studious lawyers, who by reason of their professional training came to share a
substantial measure of common understanding about the meanings
of Latin words when encountered in legal contexts.z Legal texts
meant what the lawyers of that time and place meant when using
those words to signal to one another about a matter of professional
import. Thus, in an important sense, Roman law was from its beginning "reader-centered," and in this sense "post-modem." To
provide the community of shared understanding that gave legal utterances meaning was the social and political function of the jurisconsults who met and debated cases in the baths of Rome.
Few if any Americans engaged in drafting the Constitution of
the United States had Justinian's illusions. They did not suppose
that the meaning of their utterances would be forever "plain." Nor
did they suppose that the Congress of the United States would
speak in plainer language than Justinian had been able to muster.
Indeed, to the contrary, the Founders were at pains to prevent Congress from speaking too plainly. In contrast to Parliament, for example, which often spoke and continues to speak in a unitary voice,
the American legislative power was divided in order to compel compromise among factions.3 And political compromises tend to be expressed in language laden with meanings and nuances not
necessarily the same to all the compromising groups. What the
Founders clearly contemplated was that their brief Constitution and
the later enactments of the divided government they created would
often speak loosely, in terms that might be subject to competing and
contrasting interpretations.
How did they expect that these problems of language they so
freely created would be resolved? Not, we can confidently assert, on
the basis of legislative history. The Founders had no apparent interest in what we today describe by that term, even in the legislative
history that they themselves made. James Madison was quite explicit in regard to the publication of his Notes on the 1787 Convention. He insisted that they should never be used to supply meaning
to the words he had employed as principal draftsman. He emphasized that it was not his intent or that of the Founders whose
2. See generally, John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 122-47 (U. of Mich. Law
School, 1968).
3. For an insightful treatment of the implications of parliamentary coherence, see P.S.
Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative
Study of Legal Reasoning. Legal Theory. and Legal Institutions 298-325 (Clarendon Press,
1987).
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thoughts he uttered that mattered. He was the "original" and it
was his understanding that there was no "original understanding"
among the Founders, but merely acceptance of the words embodied
in the charter itself, words to be understood by those who ratified
it, 4 and thus by the professional audience that would interpret them.
Madison was in this limited sense yet another "post-modern" person, and he would have had little regard for the efforts of those who
today seek to discern an "original understanding" of the Constitution, an "understanding" that he believed never to have existed any
more than did Justinian's understanding of the Code that he decreed.s As in Roman times, the meaning of our legal texts would be
discerned from the shared understanding of the profession that enforced them.
Thus, aware as they were of the existence of a professional
community of lawyers capable of forming a shared understanding of
the meanings of words, most of the Founders would have supposed
that at least some of their words had, and some of the utterances of
Congress would have, "plain meanings" in the sense that any person acquainted with the professional culture of law in America
would comprehend one meaning and no other. And even in circumstances of ambiguity, they might have imagined two or perhaps
even three plausible meanings of a text, but not an infinite number
depending on the imagination of the individual reader.
The Founders' hopes and expectations were fulfilled in the career of John Marshall. Marshall's great achievement was to organize his Court as an effective instrument for supplying meaning to
the nation's legal texts. The institutional means by which Marshall
achieved the Founders' purpose was the innovation of the opinion
of the court, a device previously unknown. The legal world in England and elsewhere was familiar with individual judicial opinions
given orally and seriatim and reported at the whim of such persons
as might designate themselves as reporters of those opinions. But
nowhere was there experience with a court that regularly published
reasoned statements of its decisions. 6
4. Madison does seem to have regarded the legislative history of the ratifiers to have
had some legitimacy, inasmuch as the State Conventions that conferred on the Constitution
"all the authority which it possesses." Madison to Thomas Ritchie, Sept. 15, 1821. 3 Letters
and Other Writings of James Madison 228 (J.B. Lippincott, 1865).
5. For those wishing to question this characterization of Madison, the place to begin is
Donald 0. Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 38 (1971).
6. For an account of the invention of the opinion of the court, see George L. Haskins
and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 383-87 (Macmillan, 1981). There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council
giving advice to the Crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution, at least
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The opinion of the Court did at least two things. It forced the
members of the Court to compose their differences to the extent
that they were able. To this extent, it brought compromise or group
judgment into the judicial process. Texts thus were made to mean
what a group of moderately diverse American lawyers serving appointments for life would take their words to mean. But more, the
opinion of the Court was a discipline that forced the Court to give
reasons that other lawyers could understand and respect even when
they did not agree. The opinions of the Marshall Court served to
reveal the Court to its constituency and audience, the legal profession, as an institution striving to conform its use of power to the
reasonable expectations of fellow professionals, who were in tum
striving to comprehend and interpret language in the collective national interest. Thus our texts came more specifically to mean what
a group of lawyers serving appointments for life and subject to the
discipline of providing generally persuasive written justification for
their collective action would take their words to mean. When read
in that light by a person acquainted with the professional culture,
there is indeed much of our national law that has "plain meaning."
The Marshall Court's willingness to try to unite on the meaning of such phrases as "due process of law," and to explain them to
a professional audience, proved to be a powerful device for enhancing the moral authority of the Court. This did not commend it, of
course, to those whose disagreements with Marshall were deep and
abiding, such as Jefferson's friend, John Taylor. Taylor, in an 1820
book (bearing a title equally suited to 1992: Construction Construed
and Constitutions Vindicated), deconstructed the Marshall Court's
decisions, revealing them to be the product of the aristocratic impulses of its members. The opinion of the Court, despite its proven
vulnerability to deconstruction, was nevertheless a device quickly
replicated, first in American state courts, and then in Europe. 7
John Marshall created a new industry, never before known to the
world, of timely reportage and publication of judicial opinions.
Marshall's innovation, like all successful political innovations,
grew out of the cultural soil. In the America of his time, it was
widely perceived that judges were a part of a somewhat elite and
pretentious profession that was vested with a public interest, a sort
of public utility not wholly dissimilar from the jurisconsults of
until the Privy Council Appeals Act of 1832. F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of
England 462-63 (Cambridge U. Press, 1908). See generally, John P. Dawson, The Privy
Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart Period: II, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 627 (1950).
7. See Dawson, The Oracles of the Law at 82, 402, 438 (cited in note 2). And see J.H.
Baker, Records, Reports and the Origins of Case-Law in England in John H. Baker, ed., Judicial Records, Law Reports, and the Growth of Case Law 15 (Duncker & Humblot, 1989).
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Rome. Judges were seen as fiduciaries, and the federal judges were
to be trustees of our political institutions. While there was general
recognition that these trustees were possessed of ordinary human
failings and widespread concern that these failings would result in
abuse, it was accepted as a necessity that the success of the experiment in democratic governance would depend on the good faith of
the judiciary, a good faith that would be kept or not depending on
the morality of the legal profession of which the judiciary would
necessarily be a part.
Indeed this perceived connection between the fate of the republic and the morality of the legal profession is what excited the substantial interest of the American revolutionaries in legal education.
Jefferson and Hamilton, and their contemporaries in almost every
state, sought to promote legal education as a means of assuring a
faithful judiciary.s In the succeeding generation, Henry Clay, perhaps the most consequential national figure for four decades, was
one of the founders of the Transylvania University Law Department.9 Clay's partisans, and even those of his most intense rival,
Andrew Jackson, sustained their predecessors' keen interest in legal
education as an essential element of democratic governance.w
Their politics were at cross-purposes, but they shared the aim to
develop and sustain a professional community that understood the
meaning of the nation's legal texts and a judiciary mindful of a
moral obligation to exercise the lash of power to implement those
texts in accordance with that common understanding. The premier
legal subject in the nation's colleges and law departments was thus
Constitutional Law, not Contracts.
One expression of the conventional thinking of Marshall's time
is found in the work of Hugh Henry Brackenridge.tt Brackenridge
was a Princeton classmate and friend of James Madison, a poet, a
military chaplain at Valley Forge, a Pennsylvania politician who led
the campaign for ratification and then organized the Jeffersonian
Republican Party of western Pennsylvania, a frontier lawyer, a novelist and at last a judge. Law and politics was the subject of his
8.

Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 Wm.

& Mary L. Rev. 527 (1990).

9. Paul D. Carrington, Teaching Law and Virtue at Transylvania University: The
George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years, 41 Mercer L. Rev. 673 (1990).
10. The New York University School of Law first opened in 1835 under the leadership
of Benjamin F. Butler, a "barnburner" Jacksonian. See Ronald L. Brown, The Law School
Papers of Benjamin F. Butler (Greenwood Press, 1987).
II. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Law and Chivalry: An Exhortation from the Spirit
of the Hon. Hugh Henry Brackenridge of Pittsburgh (1748-1816), 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 705
(1992). See also Madeline Sapienza, Modern Chivalry in Early American Law: H. H. Brackenridge's Legal Thought (University Press, 1992).
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serialized novel, Modern Chivalry, which was widely read in the
years following its first appearance 200 years ago. Brackenridge
also in 1814 published Law Miscellanies, a work devoted exclusively
to law and the legal profession and addressed to legal novices.
Brackenridge commenced his discourse on the meaning of legal
texts with a Roman maxim that he translated to mean: "It is the
worst slavery where the law is unknown, or uncertain."'2 He proclaimed that maxim to be the teaching of experience wherever people have tried to dispense with professional legal judgment, as they
did in his time in Pennsylvania. Where the law is unknown and
unknowable, the persons wielding the lash of power are, Brackenridge observed, out of control and prone to be abusive. Chaos results, and despotism generally follows chaos.
Yet he acknowledged that there is inevitably much uncertainty
in legal texts. "But there is the spirit, that is the construction of
laws. This depends upon the mind of the construer; and two men
may not in some cases, construe alike."'3 What informs a legal text
is reason, and hence the maxim that "nothing which is against reason, can be law."'4 He emphasized that even unwritten law can be
reasonably certain if committed to the understanding of a professional community. He noted that some of his contemporaries, notably Rousseau and Godwin, denied the efficacy of legal texts and
sought to confer on judges and other officers uncabined discretion
to infer such meanings on those texts as might suit their purposes of
the moment. This he decried as the despotism of the Ottomans. It
is to limit ukase that laws are enacted; to secure constancy of interpretation and construction, Brackenridge invoked professional
morality.
Thus Brackenridge celebrated the judiciary as the "belt of Protagoras"'s that held the nation together; he deplored the actions of
his hero, Jefferson, in attacking the federal judiciary. He emphasized that the primary qualification for judicial work was not intellect, useful though that might be. Although himself one of the
stronger intellects of his time, and especially of his community, and
although he most strongly favored the development of academic institutions, the judge did not regard intellectual attainment as a primary requirement for judicial work. "The knowledge of all law
goes but a little way to the discerning the justice of the cause....
[I]f my cause is good, and I am to have my choice of two judges, the
12. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry 541 (Claude M. Newlin, ed., American Book Co., 1937). This novel was published in installments between 1792 and 1815.
13. Id. at 542.
14. ld.
15. ld. at 786.
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one of great legal science, but deficient in natural judgment; the
other of good natural judgment, but of no legal knowledge, I would
take the one that had what we call common sense."t6
On the other hand, Brackenridge counseled young lawyers that
a lifetime was not long enough to learn all that one might usefully
know about law. "Mere genius," he affirmed, "goes but a little way
in making the lawyer; there must be a plodding and often the plodding student will reach the goal when a more lively talent will not.
A court and even a jury will rather hear him who has some depth of
judgment but without volubility or grace of diction than all the elegant vociferations where the knowledge is pretense."t7 But more
important than hard-earned legal knowledge was sound judgment,
or as Brackenridge described it, common sense. And more important still was a morality of self-restraint. There is, the judge affirmed, "such a thing as patriotism on the bench."ts
No one in Brackenridge's time doubted that legal decisions entailed political ones. But he emphasized that judging is an antidemocratic activity, especially where the power of judicial review is
exercised by life tenure appointees. For this reason, he said that any
judicial decision invalidating legislation
must be a plain and broad case that will justify the interference,
or render it safe to make the experiment. An omnipotent legislature will not readily yield to any thing but that which will carry
the sense of the community with it.t9 ... [S]crewing up the construction of the constitution too tight, the public mind will revolt
against it. Driven to a contention, much that is valuable in the
constitution might be lost in that torrent which an overstrained
construction had produced, like waters in a dam without a ftoodgate.2o

Brackenridge affirmed that the willingness and ability of judges
to practice self-restraint, to repress their "personal and factious considerations," was dependent on the expectations of the legal profession of which the judiciary was a part. If there were not a legal
16. ld. at 616-17. Redolent of Senator Hruska's plea for mediocrity on the Supreme
Court of United States was Brackenridge's observation that "A man of very moderate parts
can fill an office perhaps the better for being moderate .... " Quoted in Claude M. Newlin,
The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge 273 (Princeton U. Press, 1932).
17. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Law Miscellanies: Containing an Introduction to the
Study of Law With Some Law Cases and a Variety of Other Matters Chiefly Original xvii-xviii
(1814) (Amo Pressed., 1972) ("Law Miscellanies").
18. Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry at 544 (cited in note 12). Patriotism is needed because "[A] great difficulty arises, in the administration of the laws, to guard the consciences
of men." ld. at 543.
19. Brackenridge, Law Miscellanies at 67 (cited in note 17).
20. Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry at 545 (cited in note 12).
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audience to applaud self-restraint and to chastise self-indulgence,
the judiciary would likely break its trust. He called upon his young
readers to provide just such a professional audience. Pointing to
post-revolutionary France, he noted that a nation without lawyers
has no stability. "What could you expect," he asked "in return
from despotism but the opposite extreme? In the state of the public
mind in France, what was there to arrest at a medium? ... You
might as well expect the stone of Sysiphus down hill, of itself, to
stop short at a proper point."2t
The most illuminating early work on the meaning of our legal
texts is that of Francis Lieber. Lieber, a German-American immigrant, was teaching Constitutional Law at South Carolina in 1838
when he published a two-volume work entitled A Manual of Legal
and Political Ethics and a shorter work entitled Legal Hermeneutics.22 The latter was originally embodied in the former, but at the
suggestion of some readers of the manuscript it was broken out for
separate publication.
Lieber was recognized by his contemporaries, including James
Kent and Joseph Story, as perhaps the premier legal academic of
antebellum times. His works, which included one book entitled
Civil Liberties and Self Government, were kept in circulation
throughout the nineteenth century as a result of late editions by
such distinguished persons as President Woolsey of Yale and President Gilman of Johns Hopkins. He deserves much greater notice
among law teachers than he has received.
Lieber's writings of 1838 drew heavily on classical sources. He
was on intimate terms with Roman traditions. He also drew on the
body of literature developed in theology to establish a discipline of
interpretation of religious texts, the learning that provided the rudiments of later literary criticism. But Francis Lieber was animated
not by his affection for the classics or the scholarly discipline of
literary criticism, but by his passionate regard for democratic constitutionalism as it was then emerging in America. His works on
ethics proposed standards of conduct for public officers and for citizens at large in exercising their franchise. The inculcation of these
standards was the sovereign aim of most early American law teachers, including Joseph Story, who assigned Lieber's books to be read
by his Harvard students. Had Lieber appeared in America a decade
earlier, Jefferson probably would have selected him to be the law
professor at his university.
21. Brackenridge, Modem Chivalry at 564 (cited in note 12).
22. See Paul D. Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political
Ethics of Francis Lieber, 42 J. Legal Ed. 339 (1992).
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For Lieber, Constitutional Law was a branch of the law of
Trusts. All of us as citizens are, in his view, fiduciaries. We have
no rights, he repeatedly affirms, that are not linked to duties. Especially those exercising power or influence on public affairs have duties to their fellow citizens. For Lieber, the principles of
interpretation and construction are an important part of the standards of public ethics, dictates as to how those who apply the lash
of power conform their conduct to the common understanding of
texts to which their actions give meaning.23 His hermeneutics are
intended to guide judges and others in the repression of the "personal and factious considerations" Brackenridge described as ever
tending to subvert one's professional judgment about the meaning
of legal texts.
Lieber was fully cognizant of the problem of indeterminacy.
Indeed, he catalogues its many causes. And he even extols its benefits, observing that many political and legal blunders can result from
excessive effort to be precise and unambiguous. He cautions drafters of legal texts with a couplet he found on the wall of a tailor
shop: "tight will tear, wide will wear."24
Lieber joins Madison in questioning the utility of legislative
history or original understandings. He asserts that the motives of
the utterers of legal texts cannot be known except from the language
of their texts.2s
Yet Lieber asserts that every text has a single, correct meaning
that can generally be discerned by his interpretive methods calling
not for literal-mindedness, but for interpretation that remains close
to the text but mindful of its context.26 Sometimes, Lieber acknowledges, circumstances require that meaning be constructed outside
the text,27 but this should be done with much caution to avoid
usurpations.
Both construction and interpretation are to be guided by considerations of the public interest as seen through the spectacles of
the community to be served. This discipline requires resistance to
meanings that the interpreter may personally prefer, or may find
most congenial to factional interests that he or she may favor.
Whether or not the judge rejoices in what the public reckons to be
23. For another contemporary review of Lieber, see James Farr, The Americanization of
Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics in Gregory Leyh, ed., Legal
Hermeneutics 83 (U. of Cal. Press, 1992).
24. Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics 195 (William G. Hammond, ed.,
F.H. Thomas, 1880). This work was first published in 1838.
25. ld. at 102.
26. Id. at 11·12.
27. ld. at Ill.
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its interest, he or she, Lieber tells us, cannot "run against the movement of' his or her time.2s Laws and courts, he tells us, must be
seen by citizens to operate for the advantage of society. The interpreter of the law must therefore be careful not to misjudge his or
her own time, for everyone desiring to justify extravagant construction can do so on the ground that a case is peculiar or a time
critical.29
Lieber thus understands that his principles of interpretation
and construction are no more than loose guides. He would have
been unsurprised to have applied to them the criticism that Karl
Llewellyn was later to make of the canons of statutory construction.3o For every thrust by one such canon, Llewellyn informed us,
there is an appropriate parry by another. Lieber knew that his principles were as vulnerable to misuse as the legal texts they were
designed to illuminate. What he sought to foster by his teaching
was not an empty formalism based on rules of hermeneutics, but a
spirit of duty and of respect for the rights and reasonable expectations of lawyers advising clients, even those clients whom the person wielding the lash of power might despise.
Lieber does not expect to locate the discipline and the wisdom
required for wise interpretation in every citizen. He discerns that
most persons lacking professional discipline are prone to forget
"that there are two parties in questions of justice" or that the law is
"not one [found] within [one's own] breast."3I Lieber is cautious
about lawyers and counsels drafters of legal texts against needless
intricacy, which he describes as a national curse because it can
"unite the lawyers into a compact, formidable and privileged class,
to be compared only to the priesthood of some nations, ruling the
uninitiated."32 But in the end, he affirms the indispensability of the
legal profession as the instrument of self-discipline in interpretation.
In asserting the relation between the ethics of the legal profession and the efficacy of our law, the work of Brackenridge and
Lieber lends support to the thesis advanced by Judge Harry Edwards in a recent issue of the Michigan Law Review: that the existing and seemingly growing disjunction between the commercial
impulses of much of the bar and the academized and theoretical
28.
29.
30.
Canons
31.
32.

ld. at 126.
Id. at 129.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
About how Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 41 (cited in note 24).
ld. at 155.
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impulses of many law teachers is not good for the law.33 To interpret legal texts wisely, the practitioners must lay aside the private
interests of their clients and the teachers must lay aside the impulse
to creativity and novelty.
I would like to conclude by speculating on what Lieber would
say to his successors teaching Constitutional Law 120 years after his
death. Being one who ever exulted in his own good fortune, he
would, I think, emphasize the enormity of the privileges enjoyed by
those who teach Constitutional Law in America. He would cite our
freedom and independence as unequalled in all history. He would
then affirm that these rights, like all others, bear duties, in our case
to use our fortunate status wisely and with restraint. He would remind us that we are not called to our roles as law teachers to manipulate legal texts for the advantage of some cause of great interest to
ourselves or to our academic colleagues. He would declare that as
fiduciaries, when interpreting legal texts, we are obliged to silence
within ourselves those "personal and factious considerations" tending to deflect our professional judgment as to what legal texts mean.
It was ever his boast that he absolutely "belong(ed) to no party"
when teaching.34 And he ever cautioned against the indulgence of
emotions allowed to
run so high that the greatest link and tie of humanity, language,
loses its very essence, and people cease to understand one another, when even the best-intended words ... are unintentionally
yet passionately or willfully wronged, misconstrued, wrung from
their very sense.3s

Lieber insisted that, even where there is ambiguity, there is one
meaning of the law that best fits the interests of us all. While it is
the task of the legal scholar to unfold that meaning, it is framed not
by the expectations and understandings of the legal academy but by
those of the larger legal profession of which we are a part. And
those expectations are in turn informed by the culture of which the
legal profession is a part and a product. In his insistence on one
meaning, he reminds us that we can have but one Constitution and
one body of national law. The most elementary meaning of equal
protection of the law requires that all our law must be the same for
33. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 9! Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
34. Francis Lieber, The Ancient and the Modern Teacher of Politics in I The Misceo/aneous Writings of Francis Lieber 374 (Daniel C. Gilman, ed., J.B. Lippincott, 1881). See
also letter to Oscar Lieber, Nov. 1860, in Thomas Perry, The Life and Letters of Francis
Lieber 313 (J.R. Osgood, 1882).
35. Francis Lieber, II Manual of Political Ethics 262 (Theodore D. Woolsey, ed, J.B.
Lippincott, 1888).
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all of us and cannot have different meanings according to the gender, color or ethnic identity of the person interpreting it. It is in
that important sense that we are one profession; however conflicted
our politics, we are obliged to read our texts together as one. To do
so is perhaps the central attribute of being professionals. If the adherents of both Jefferson and Hamilton, and of Clay and Jackson,
could unite on that understanding of legal professionalism, so can
we.

